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This dissertation evaluates the Organization for the Harmonisation of Business Law in 
Africa (OHADA) in relation to the informal sector in West Africa.  The paper also 
considers the challenges to successful legal reform arising from the interaction of African 
cultural and social values with imposed formal law.  Means to improve links between 
OHADA formal laws and institutions to the realities of the majority of Africans living 
and operating in the informal sector are suggested.  These topics are explored within a 
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If development is seen, not as a continuing process and one where the aim is to improve the lot 
of the individual, but as something commanded and imposed from above, then it will engage the 
support of those who wield the levers of power centrally, and they will wield these levers with 
scant regard to the declared aims which they purport to espouse.1 
 
Most people in Africa earn their livelihoods and obtain the goods and services they need 
within a social network outside the formal, regulated sectors of society.  Therefore, any 
legal reform effort intended to foster economic development must address the realities of 
the informal sector.  With this in mind, this dissertation evaluates the Organization for the 
Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) in relation to the informal sector in 
West Africa.2  The fundamental question is what impact does OHADA have, or could 
have, on the informal sector actors and, consequently, what is OHADA’s impact on the 
economic development of the region.  For the purposes of this paper, the litmus test for 
effectiveness of OHADA is whether its formal laws are able to assist those living and 
working in the informal sector in the region.  My premise is that there can be no true 
development in any meaningful sense of the word unless those lives are improved.   This 
paper is also concerned with the challenge to successful legal reform arising from the 
interaction of African customary laws and social values with imposed formal law of 
foreign origin.  The socially embedded informal institutions, norms, and practices in 
West Africa have a significant impact on legal reform and on the prospects of 
development in the region.  In a broader sense, this paper seeks to understand what role 
private economic law has or could have in enhancing development and contributing to 
poverty alleviation.  
Chapter One introduces background concepts and an analytical framework regarding 
the complex relationship between laws and development generally and in the African 
                                                 
1 Antony Allott ‘Development for What? False Gods and Holy Writ’ (1984) 3 Third World Legal Stud. 1, 5. 
2 The acronym is from the French: l’Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires. 
Evidence from other sub-Saharan African countries is also considered.  Unless otherwise specified, Africa 





context specifically.  The concepts and issues discussed therein lay the analytical 
foundation for the rest of the paper.  Chapter Two explores the scope and characteristics 
of the informal sector in Africa, including the ubiquitous informal networks and 
institutions extant in West Africa.  A detailed description of the tontine is provided as an 
exemplar of an effective informal and indigenous mutual aid association. The causes of 
informality are beyond the scope of this paper and important gender issues are not 
addressed.  Regardless of one’s perspective concerning the role of informal institutions 
and their impact on commerce in the region, the reality of the informal sector must be 
understood and addressed before any commercial law reform can be effectuated.   
Chapter Three presents an overview and critique of pertinent aspects of OHADA as well 
of some of its foundational assumptions.  The primary concern is OHADA’s irrelevance 
to the large informal sector in the region and, consequently, the diminished prospects for 
development.  A functional approach to laws and law reform is recommended.  In 
Chapter Four, ways to improve links between OHADA formal laws and institutions to the 
realities of the informal sector are explored.  Such links would benefit informal sector 
actors and might also improve the understanding and acceptance of OHADA laws.  Two 
possible linkages are the addition of mediation as an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism and the incorporation of stakeholder-oriented, corporate social responsibility 
norms into OHADA laws.  Recent legislation regarding cooperatives offers the most 
significant opportunity to improve links between OHADA and the informal sector and to 
enhance the prospects of development in the region.  Finally, the issue of reintegration of 









CHAPTER ONE –  LAWS AND DEVELOPMENT 
1.1 What is Development? 
We first need a clear notion of what we mean by development: what is its purpose and 
whom is it for?3   Development is too often defined only in terms of economic 
development, as growth or increase in resources or other factors.4  Growth itself is not 
economic development, and economic development, although necessary, is not sufficient 
for development to occur.  It is possible to have growth without development.  An 
increase in gross domestic product or national income, for instance, is not alone useful 
measures of development.  Development is a continuing improvement in the interrelated 
economic, social, and political conditions and institutions in a state which enables or 
allows for the individual capability of its citizens.  This definition reflects the ‘human 
capability’ concept of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, for whom the concept of 
development is most fundamentally about ‘the achievement of a better life’ for human 
beings.5  Development is the enhancement of certain human ‘functionings’ and the 
expansion of human capabilities to so function.6  Economic growth, however measured, 
is but a means for other things concerning human ‘well-being.’7  Under this view all 
countries are developing ones.8  Economic development is ultimately about the effective 
freedoms and capabilities that people have in the economic sphere, in particular to have 
basic economic needs fulfilled.9  Economic development must also be sustainable.  
Sustainable economic growth requires that a country have inclusive political and 
                                                 
3 Allott op cit (n1) 2, 4. 
4 Ibid. 
5 David A Crocker ‘Functioning and Capability: The Foundation of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s Development 
Ethic’ (1992) 20 (4) Political Theory 584 at 585.   
6 Ibid at 587. 
7 Ibid.     
8 Allott op cit (n1) 4. 
9 Amartya Sen ‘What is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in the Development Process’ (2006) in 





economic institutions.10  Fundamental to the creation or enhancement of inclusive 
institutions is the existence of a pluralistic society wherein competing interests and values 
have a voice.11  Ultimately development is what people in a given society want and the 
meaning they give to it.  Since this paper addresses the relationship between commercial 
laws and economic activities, it is most directly concerned with economic development, 
but with a view towards development in its deeper sense as outlined above. 
1.2 Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism 
 1.2.1 Rule of Law 
‘The “rule of law” is an ideal that does not mean any single thing.’12  While there is 
agreement on the necessity of the rule of law, there is no agreement on its essential 
characteristics.13  In a minimalist conception, the rule of law means that all citizens and 
government officials and agents are bound, and generally abide, by enforceable rules.14  
The rule of law also requires at least some basic level of personal and civic safety and 
security.  More expansive concepts of the rule of law expect governing institutions, 
including the formal legal system, to bring about various desired objectives, such as 
stability, predictability, transparency, accountability, and even democracy.  Most rule of 
law projects focus on institutional reform of the judicial system as a means to bring about 
those objectives.  Many rule of law projects promote market liberalism, with emphasis 
placed on the enforcement of private property rights and contracts, operating under the 
presumption that the rule law is an instrument of economic development.  (OHADA is an 
example of such a rule of law project, as will be shown in Chapter 3.) 
                                                 
10 Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and 
Poverty (2012) 79-95, 429-31. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Brian Z Tamanaha ‘The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development’ (2011) 44 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 209 at 245. 
13 H Patrick Glenn ‘Sustainable Diversity in Law’ (2011) 3 HJRL 39 at 44.  





Rule of law projects are implicitly informed by the unstated assumption that law 
will (and must) be consolidated within the state.15  The current rule of law theory is 
largely fixated on formal institutions, and the projects are often disconnected to the actual 
results of their implementation.16  Rule of law reforms also ignore the majority of 
Africans living in accordance with customary laws under traditional authority.17  For Sen, 
any conception of the rule of law must consider peoples’ substantive freedom to exercise 
their rights and entitlements, and not only legislation and formal laws.18  Vanderlinden 
reminds us, justice is a dominant value implied in anything legal and law should foster 
social justice.19  Most contemporary legal theory also presumes an underlying problem of 
conflict and a need for uniformity, with the rule of law as means of conflict resolution.20  
However, it is not clear that a multiplicity of laws and the contact of legal orders must 
generate conflict.21  In many instances there is ‘not a conflict so much as a search for 
accommodation.’22  Because the rule of law has become a ‘contested concept,’ Glenn 
suggests replacing it with the ‘rule of laws.’23  A rule of laws approach, however, requires 
‘active support of the means of the conciliation’ among these laws.24  The conciliation 
                                                 
15 Tamanaha ‘Rule of Law’ op cit (n14) 14. 
16 Glenn op cit (n13) 45. 
17 Joseph M Isanga ‘Rethinking the Rule of Law as Antidote to African Development Challenges’ in David 
K Linnan (ed) Legitimacy, Legal Development and Change: Law and Modernization Reconsidered (2012) 
60. 
18 Sen op cit (n9) 39. 
19 Jacques Vanderlinden ‘What Kind of Law Making in a Global World? The Case of Africa’ (2007) 67 La. 
L. Rev. 1043 at 1045, 1047. 
20 Glenn op cit (n13) 53.   
21 Ibid.  For instance, there was little confusion and no perceived conflict in English legal history until the 
emergence of the nation state from the seventeenth century.  Multiple laws co-existed in non-conflictual 
relationships, even within the same territory. 
22 Ibid at 54.  






among laws in Africa is critical, since the ‘conciliation of laws may well provide a major 
means of conciliation of peoples.’25    
1.2.2 Legal Pluralism 
 The term legal pluralism describes the situation in which a population observes more 
than one body of law and the phenomenon of law beyond the state.26  Multiple normative 
orders exist within every society, including (contemporary) traditional or customary 
systems.27  Legal pluralism is a prominent feature in African states, and has increased 
with continuing globalisation.28  A pluralist view of law requires one to distinguish 
between law and laws – between a single global law and a plurality of laws.29  Legal 
pluralism itself is neither a solution nor a problem, but is rather the empirical fact or 
default position of African legal systems.30  Rule of law reforms often increase legal 
pluralism.31  Land titling projects, for example, create a situation where people are 
confronted with two competing legal systems: state law granting individual, freehold 
ownership and customary laws granting communal rights.32 
According to Glenn, since non-state law can never be eliminated, diversity of 
laws is inevitable and should be seen as sustainable.33  Sustaining the diversity of laws 
requires abandoning the presumption that law is defined in terms of state law, and it also 
requires that the law of the state be ‘normatively justified in local circumstance.’34  The 
idea of sustainable diversity in law, however, is incompatible with the most conceptions 
                                                 
25 Glenn op cit (n13) 53. 
26 Ibid at 46. 
27 Tamanaha ‘Rule of Law’ op cit (n14) 5, 7. 
28  Ibid at 9. 
29 Vanderlinden op cit (n19) 1058 
30  Glenn op cit (n13) 46-47.  
31 Tamanaha ‘Rule of Law (op cit n14) 11 
32 Ibid. 
33 Glenn op cit (n13) 47-48.   





of the rule of law.35  Effective law reform needs to recognise and pay attention to all the 
‘legal formants’ in a legal system and to identify the scope of each.36  Legal formants are 
all the elements that constitute the living law of a people or a state, which may or may not 
be in harmony (and may diverge) with each other.37 
1.3. Economic Development and Legal Reform 
Although a positive correlation between the rule of law and economic development has 
been demonstrated, serious doubts exist as to which specific factors in a rule of law 
measure account for this correlation and there are unresolved questions about causality.38  
The interrelationships between an economic system and the legal system are extremely 
complex.39  The importance of law and legal institutions for economic growth is 
generally accepted, but broader research is needed on the nature of institutions and laws 
that promote growth.40  The optimal legal rules depend upon the underlying economic 
situation, and the legal and judicial system need to be flexible in order to adopt those 
rules to an evolving economy.41  Many different types of legal systems can satisfy 
economic needs and selected improvements in economic performance can be made 
without a comprehensive legal system.42  Informal norms and institutions often 
supplement and even supplant formal law in the facilitation of business transactions.43   
 
                                                 
35 Glenn op cit (n13) 53. 
36 Rudolfo Sacco ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ (1991) 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 
1 at 22. 
37 Ibid at 27, 30. 
38 Tamanaha ‘Primacy of Society” op cit (n12) 227-29. 
39 RH Coase The Firm, the Market, and the Law (1988) 28. 
40 Frank B Cross ‘Law and Economic Growth’ (2002) 80 Texas Law Review 1737 at 1743, 1774-75.  
41 Ibid at 1771-72 (‘more law is not necessarily better than less law’). 
42 Tamanaha ‘Primacy of Society’ op cit (n12) 230-31. 
43 Kerry Rittich ‘The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the Incorporation 
of the Social’ in David M Trubeck and Alvaros Santos (eds) The New Law and Economic Development: A 






We must be cautious about our assumptions about the role of law in development and 
must remain aware of the background norms and culture that influence the efficacy of 
formal laws.44  ‘There is a great deal of evidence suggesting that an efficient judiciary 
and clearly defined property rights are often of limited relevance to entrepreneurs in 
developing countries.’45  Many of the assumptions underlying development programs 
have remained practically untested in the African context.46  There are good reasons, for 
instance, to doubt that contract enforcement institutions play the central role attributed to 
them by law and development experts.47  Local, informal institutions can often substitute 
for formal, third-party contract enforcement.48  And while property rights might be 
important for economic growth, the substantive nature of those rights is critical.49  There 
are different bundles of legal entitlements associated with property rights in different 
societies.50  The meaning and consequence of real (immovable) property ownership 
prevalent in African society are very different from countries where freehold or fee 
simple ownership is the norm.  In many African communities, members possess differing 
rights to use land in various capacities.51  Because these customary rights are not 
recognised by ‘standard’ legal titles, the process of titling can extinguish them, and, if 
                                                 
44 David Kennedy ‘Laws and Developments’ in John Hatchard and Amanda Perry-Kessaris (eds) Law and 
Development: Facing Complexity in the 21st Century (2010) 20. (‘Many ideas about law expect the legal 
order to perform feats we know it can rarely accomplish.’) 
45 Kevin E Davis and Michael J Trebilcock ‘The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimists 
versus Skeptics’ (2008) 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 895 at 936. 
46Julie Paquin Legal Reforms and Business Contracts in Developing Countries: Trust, Culture, and Law in 
Dakar  (2012) 4.   
47 Ibid at 126.  (Findings based on qualitative data gathered from extensive interviews with 30 micro-
operators in Dakar, focused on their contracting practices and dispute resolution preferences.) 
48 Glenn op cit (n13) 56. 
49 Cross op cit (n40) 1771.  (One cannot even generally say that more or stronger property rights are better 
than fewer or weaker property rights.  Moreover, titling ownership in real property has not always been 
economically beneficial. Id at 1771-72.) 
50 Ibid at 1743.  





used as collateral, land will be lost and re-distributed when loans are not duly paid.52  
Since community life is anchored to, and revolves around, the land, dispossession upends 
the social life of the community; members can lose their homes, livelihoods, and possibly 
even food source.53  Standard land titling can also enable traditional leaders to register 
and sell or borrow against property, and thereby possibly dispossessing members of the 
community and altering access to and the distribution of land in ways that were not 
possible under customary systems.54  In addition, when reduced to a single titled owner, 
ownership rights often favour men to the detriment of women.55 
1.3.2 Choices  
An idea of what is intended by development must be specific to the prevailing market 
conditions and institutional and cultural settings.56  Development policy needs to be 
grounded in an understanding about how particular political and economic ‘distributive 
choices’ will put resources into the hands of those whose return on their use will cause 
development to occur.57  Without knowing what could be achieved with alternative 
institutional arrangements, it is impossible to choose sensibly among them.58  And while 
a legal regime can offer an arena to view and contest distributive choices, it cannot 
substitute for them.59  As a development strategy, the rule of law offers the ‘false 
promise’ that it can substitute for all these difficult, normative political and economic 
choices.60 
                                                 
52 Tamanaha ‘Primacy of Society’ op cit (n12) 239-40.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Tamanaha ‘Rule of Law’ op cit (n14) 11.   
55 Ibid. 
56 Kennedy ‘Laws and Developments’ op cit (n44) 18, 21. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Coase op cit (n39) 30. 
59 David Kennedy ‘Political Choices’ in David M Trubeck and Alvaros Santos (eds) The New Law and 
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (2006) 169. 





 1.3.3 Demand for Law 
A more complete understanding of the relationship between law and economic activity 
must also account for the demand for law, and not only its supply.61  ‘The significance 
and effectiveness of legal reforms depends almost entirely on whether local 
constituencies demand it.’62  A legal system must serve the needs of its people if it is to 
gain the requisite respect and support.  The specific result also depends on which 
constituencies are demanding the law or in control of the reform process, who most often 
are the political or legal elites rather than the broader population.  Most rule of law 
initiatives are also dominated by the agendas of the promotors on the delivery or supply 
side.63  The demand for law and the ability to voice that demand is significantly affected 
by the organization and functions of the legal system, a point we will return to (infra 
4.3).64    
1.4 Law and Development 
The phrase ‘law and development’ is used when the objective in rule of law reform is 
explicitly about improving economic development in less developed economies and 
where ‘the development of law is promoted as a means to achieve the economic 
development end.’65  Law and development projects are always presented as being for the 
benefit of recipient countries and their people, but they are rarely by or of those countries 
or people.66  Efforts at law and development have failed to promote economic 
development and, moreover, there is no consensus on how to bring about development.67  
The failure of the developmental legal theories in Africa runs parallel to the increasing 
                                                 
61 Milhaupt, Curtis J ‘Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking Law’s Relationship to the Economy – Implications 
for Policy’ (2009) 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 831 at 839. 
62 Ibid at 843.    
63 Tamanaha ‘Primacy of Society’ op cit (n12) 220, 244. 
64 Milhaupt op cit (n61) 839.   
65 Tamanaha ‘Primacy of Society’ op cit (n12) 225. 
66 Ibid at 243. 





underdevelopment of the countries involved.68  The failures appear to be conceptual, and 
not from the lack of talent or money.69   
There is an unsettling lack of consensus about the role of law in development and unresolved 
uncertainty about the validity of basic assumptions underlying efforts to promote legal reform.  
Under these circumstances there is a distinct possibility that not only will legal reform not have 
any positive impact on development but that the resources invested in legal reform might have 
been deployed in some other fashion that would have a greater impact on development.70 
 
Therefore, the label ‘law and development’ is misleading and will be disappointing if it 
suggests that law in and of itself has a special ability to deliver desired development 
goals.71 
Notwithstanding the failures of law and development, legal development continues.  
Legal development, however, is not about developing the rule of law as such, but rather it 
is about getting legal institutions to adequately address basic legal needs.72  Legal 
development must be seen as a constitutive part of the development process, and not 
merely as a means to some other the end.73  Law and development doctrine has evolved 
since the mid-1990s, and now acknowledges (at least rhetorically) the importance of 
existing local institutions and conditions and also recognises the social, structural, and 
human dimensions of development.74  Previous law and development movements paid 
little or no attention to customary laws and other informal legal institutions.75  This new 
paradigm offers a more ‘holistic’ view of development where the ‘constitutive 
                                                 
68 Vanderlinden op cit (n19) 1052. 
69 Glenn op cit (n13) 40. 
70 Davis & Trebilcock op cit (n45) 937.  
71 Tamanaha ‘Primacy of Society’ op cit (n12) 247.  
72 Ibid at 244. 
73 Sen op cit (n9) 40. 
74 David M Trubek and Alvaros Santos ‘Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development and the 
Emergence of a New Critical Practice’ in David M Trubeck and Alvaros Santos (eds) The New Law and 
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (2006) 9. 





dimensions (economic, social, political, and legal) are viewed interdependently.’76  There 
is also an emphasis on consensus building and increasing participation of all stakeholders 
that was missing in previous doctrinal ‘moments.’77  Nevertheless, the justification for 
formal law remains centred on its presumed role in attracting investment and promoting 
growth.78   As will be seen in Chapter 3, it appears that OHADA reforms were 
conceptualised under the sway of older, now discredited, law and development ideology. 
1.5   Aspects of Law Reform 
1.5.1 Interconnectedness of Law 
Law (its qualities, character, and consequences) is connected to and influenced by every 
aspect of the surrounding society, and thus the legal system in every society is unique.79  
Accordingly, the following maxims should be kept in mind when promoting legal reform:  
(1) there can be no standard formula for the law; (2) a good law in one location may have 
negative effects or be dysfunctional elsewhere; and (3) it is hazardous to extrapolate 
experiences from one situation to the next.80  The interconnectedness of law also means 
we must be cautious about destroying existing institutions, social networks, and 
economic patterns.81   
1.5.2 Standardisation of Law 
The standardisation (or unification) of law is expected to accelerate the ‘process of legal 
convergence’ –  the supposed benefits of which are the reduction of transaction costs for 
transnational investors and the improved quality of domestic legal institutions.82  The 
                                                 
76 Trubek & Santos op cit (n74) 12. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Rittich op cit (n43) 203, 224. 
79 Tamanaha ‘Primacy of Society’ op cit (n12) 214, 219.   
80 Ibid at 219, 222, 232. 
81 Kennedy ‘Political Choices’ op cit (n59) 154. 
82 Katharina Pistor ‘The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies’ (2002) 50 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 97. (Standardisation considered by the author involves non-binding international laws and rules 





underlying premise is that well-designed legal standards once adopted by domestic 
governments will change the behaviour of individuals and entities and thereby influence 
the path of future economic development.83  According to Pistor, the quest for 
standardisation ignores a central feature of successful economic development, which is 
the ‘constant change, innovation, and adaptation of institutions and organizations in a 
competitive environment.’84  Standardisation may, in fact, undermine the development of 
effective legal systems due to the interdependence of legal rules and concepts and the fact 
that law is a ‘cognitive institution.’85  The interdependence of legal rules means that most 
rules are not freestanding and can only be understood and applied with reference to other 
legal rules which either must already exist or must be created.86  ‘Without ensuring 
complementarities between the new law and pre-existing legal institutions, harmonisation 
(sic) may distort rather than improve the domestic legal framework.’87  The notion that 
law is a cognitive institution means that for law to be effective, it must be fully 
understood and embraced by all those who are subject to, use, or enforce the law (its 
constituents).88  The external supply of standardised or uniform law ‘sterilises the process 
of law-making from political and socioeconomic development’ and ‘thereby distances it 
from the process of continuous adaption and innovation.’89   Standardisation reduces the 
choices for domestic lawmakers in developing their own legal solutions, which might be 
a better fit for the problems they face or for the institutional capacities they have.90  
                                                                                                                                                 
Although not identical concepts or activities, legal standardisation and legal unification are similar enough 
in method and affect to treat them as equivalent for expositional purposes. 
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1.5.3 Legal Transplantation 
Wholesale, ethnocentric legal transplantations fail because: (1) they are not accessible to 
the majority of people; (2) they are not adapted to prevailing legal and economic 
circumstances and cultures; (3) they are grafted onto legal systems that suffer from 
systemic problems; or (4) they lack sufficient resources and local stakeholders committed 
to the success of the law.91  Law reform poses a particular challenge for external 
initiatives because the ‘social embeddedness’ of law can be nearly imperceptible from the 
outside.92  The fact that most legal rules can be understood only in the context of a given 
legal order is a serious constraint for legal transplantation, because the meaning of legal 
statements is a function of social norms, not of the speaker’s intention.93   The import of 
foreign concepts thought of as global concepts can aggravate the existing circumstances 
that were sought to be remedied.94 
1.5 Institutional Perspective 
An institutional perspective on development has become increasingly prominent.  
Institutions are any form of ‘constraint’ that humans devise to shape human interaction.95  
For purposes of this paper, institutions are those organisations or entities (formal and 
informal) in a society that are responsible for making, administering, enforcing, or 
adjudicating its laws and policies.  Their major role is to reduce uncertainty by 
establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction in 
everyday life.96  For North, institutions, and the incentives they create, are the underlying 
determinant of the long-run performance of economies.97  Although this theory is now the 
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consensus, more knowledge is needed about the specific channels through which 
institutions affect growth.98  There is less consensus about which legal institutions are 
important and about how to improve legal institutional quality.99  Because informal 
institutions are embodied in customs, tradition, and codes of conduct, they are not 
susceptible to deliberate efforts at reform or to changes in the formal rules.100  The 
resulting tension between altered formal rules and the persisting informal institutions has 
important implications for the way law and economies change.101    Therefore, legal 
reform must operate within a complex set of ‘context-dependent particularities 
(economic, political, social, and cultural)’ which affect the nature and scope of feasible 
institutional reforms.102 
1.6.1 Path Dependence 
The centrality of path dependence is a key consideration in determining how to change 
dysfunctional or ineffective institutions.103  Path dependence theory describes how over 
time the reinforcement of a given set arrangements or way of doing things (a path) raises 
the cost, and thus difficulty, of changing that path.104  This is true even if the current path 
is inefficient and generates sub-optimal outcomes.  As more and more people invest in a 
given path, these investments (time, money, skills, expectations) add up and the relative 
costs of exploring alternatives (switching costs) steadily rise.105  Moreover, switching 
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costs also may reflect deeply embedded cultural practices that are resistant to change.106  
Although path dependence theory is not deterministic, it does mean that institutional 
change will be only incremental and will occur at the margins.107  Therefore, ‘ambitious, 
across-the-board legal reforms carry a significantly greater risk of failure than more 
modest or incremental reforms.’108       
1.7 Customary Law Considerations 
Customary laws continue to regulate nearly every facet of life of Africans who live 
outside the formal structures of the state.109  State law in Africa generally has only a 
limited impact on many people’s lives.110  Customary institutions are deeply entrenched 
sources of norms of solidarity and community and represent legitimacy to Africans.111    
They might either undermine or supplant formal legal norms and legal institutions.112  
Therefore, it is important to understand and give due consideration to customary or 
traditional institutions and their influence on legal reform and development.113  Titling 
land, for instance, is a complex and monumental task in Africa that cannot be equitably 
or efficiently accomplished without first understanding and addressing traditional rights 
and obligations related to land tenure.  Moreover, ‘reforms that adapt traditional 
institutions may mitigate problems of cultural dissonance.’114 
1.6.1 African Customary Law  
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Customary law is generally defined as a ‘normative order (or a body of interrelated 
norms, rules or principles) observed by a population, having been formed by regular 
social behaviour and the development of an accompanying sense of obligation.’115   
Regarding this definition, however, Glenn offers some caution: 
The process of transformation of unwritten law into what is known as ‘custom’ was a 
long and difficult process, inextricably linked to the emergence of state law.  The process 
eventually gave rise to a definition of custom which reduced it to repetitive practice, even 
under a present sense obligation.  Custom thus became what certain people do, in an 
observable manner, and law was thus reduced to observable fact, stripped of normative 
force.  The requirement of a sense of obligation on the part of participants is also mere 
fact, since what is required is its existence and not any justifiable reason for the sense of 
obligation.  Custom in its western sense thus becomes not the normative teaching of a 
past which continues to live and persuade, but present, observable reaction to whatever 
may be remembered of it.116 
 
Customary laws are ‘inextricable parts of the local, indigenous cultures that form the 
basis of members’ identities, but have varying degrees of mandatory force’ and are 
subject to constant change.117  They coexist with state laws throughout Africa, and they 
continue to be generally observed, whether or not they are in accord with state laws.118  
Customary laws are deeply rooted beliefs which are not just rules but entire ways of 
life.119  Although there is no single system of African customary law, there is sufficient 
similarity among systems to treat African customary law as a coherent unit.120  Allott 
identifies several ‘postulates of African law’: (1) everyone belongs by nature to a variety 
of human communities – territorial and familial; (2) membership gives individuals the 
right to draw on the resources of the community, but with a countervailing obligation to 
respect the underlying and continuing (paramount) needs of the rest of the community; 
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(3) an individual is entitled to the fruits of his own labour; and (4) disputes must be 
resolved in such a way that the future harmony of the community is restored.121 
Everyone living under customary law belongs to a kinship or family group, but 
there is considerable variation in the size and composition of the group and in the degree 
of collective action which such a group undertakes.122  While African customary laws 
don’t contain modern legal conceptions of juristic personality, the notion of ‘joint-ness’ 
in customary groups is strong and they often function as corporate legal entities.123  
Although African laws historically emphasised group and community rights and powers, 
individuals were always accorded legal capacity to hold interest in property, to negotiate 
with each other, and to appear as principals in litigation.124  There is no general theory of 
obligations or modern sense of contracts under African customary law.125  But 
enforceable agreements, such as contracts of agistment, tenancy, service, and 
manufacture have always existed.126  Moreover, the settlement of disputes usually rests 
on a basis of agreement.127  The content of the customary laws of Africa has changed 
significantly in the past and continues to change today, with the increasing degree of 
incorporation of African communities into national, regional, and international 
communities as the cause of most changes.128  Modern economic activities are generally 
governed by versions of received law, only sometimes adapted to meet local 
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circumstances.129  (Ignoring customary law in regard to modern economic activities is 
problematic, as will be discussed infra 3.4.2.) 
1.6.2 Conceptual Difficulties 
Several aspects of customary law (in addition to its constantly changing nature) make it 
difficult to analyse and write about.  First, it is oral and the very act of recording what one 
believes customary law to be likely distorts it.130  Secondly, there is disagreement about 
the meaning and appropriate use of different terminology – traditional, customary, native, 
or indigenous.  The phrase ‘originally African law’ has been suggested.131  Thirdly, there 
is a divergence between customary law as it has been sanctioned or enforced by the state 
(official customary law) and customary law under which the relevant community is 
actually operating (living customary law).  Fourthly, there is sometimes an ideological or 
political aspect to the conception of customary law.  For instance, one view is that 
customary law is not merely indigenous African law but rather is the result of particular 
historical circumstances and is relatively recent in origin.132  Notwithstanding the 
difficulties involved with conceptualising customary law, it is critical to do so because of 
its role in Africa with regard to legal development and the relationship between these 
laws and economic development.  Reference to ‘customary law’ throughout this paper is 
meant to capture the concept of contemporary, living customary laws that, although 
evolving, are mostly indigenous to traditional African societies.  
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CHAPTER TWO –  THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
  2.1 Definition of the Informal Sector  
The informal sector plays a dominant role in African economies and is a central issue for 
economic development, but relatively little is known about the complex reality of 
informal sector institutions.133  The term ‘informal’ in this context originated in the 1970s 
as a way of conceptualizing the unregulated activities of the poor in Third World cities.134  
The distinction between formality and informality in economic activity is a much 
criticised ‘constructed duality,’ but it has been useful in analysing the phenomenon and 
structuring official statistics.135  The problems with the concept of informality arise in 
part from the multiplicity of definitions and the plurality of measurement methods.136  
Moreover, the formal and informal ends of the economic continuum are often 
‘dynamically linked.’137  Informality should be viewed, therefore, as being a matter of 
degree, lying on a continuum best captured by a range of indicators.138  The current 
official definition of ‘informal sector’ adopted by the International Labour Organisation 
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(ILO) is based on characterizing an enterprise as informal, and empirical studies have 
largely followed this approach.139  
[The informal sector] consists of units engaged in the production of goods or services with 
primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned [that] 
typically operate at a low level of organization . . . and on a small scale.  Labour relations . . . 
are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social relations . . ..  
 
There are three related official statistical terms and definitions which are often used 
imprecisely and interchangeably – informal economy, informal employment, and the 
informal sector.140  Informal employment and the informal sector are measured 
differently and involve somewhat different policy issues and responses.141  The 
informal sector, which is a subset of the broader informal economy, is the concern of this 
paper.  The term ‘micro-enterprise’ will be used to refer to an entity or firm – with or 
without employees – conducting commercial activities or transactions and operating 
almost entirely within the informal sector, and the term ‘micro-operator’ will be used to 
refer to the individual actor who owns or operates a micro-enterprise.  The informal 
sector is where the small, usually unregistered, own-account workers that dominate West 
African economies operate in an environment characterised by the ease of entry, with 
little capital and equipment, and no access to formal markets or credit, to education and 
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training, or to services and amenities.142  A significant dimension in the concept of 
informality is the notion of informal as being outside the reach of different levels and 
mechanisms of official governance.143  But informal norms and practices are not so much 
in opposition to formal laws as they are reflective of a different reality and responsive to 
different needs.   
2.2 Size of the Informal Sector 
There is a lack of sufficient data on the size, composition, and contribution of the 
informal sector, and also problems that limit the international comparability of data.144  
There is no single statistical aggregate that corresponds to the concept of informality.145  
Moreover, many countries exclude agriculture from their measurements of the informal 
sector, while others measure only the urban informal sector.146  Nevertheless, what is 
clear is that the informal sector is the most significant portion of the economies of Africa 
and is increasing both in terms of overall employment and as a share of the total 
economy.  In West Africa as much as 90 per cent of total employment and up to 60 per 
cent of gross domestic product is produced by informal activities.147  For instance, based 
on the most recently available data, the ILO calculated informal sector employment to be 
70 percent in Côte d’Ivorie (2008) and 71 percent in Mali (2004).148  Informal traders in 
the African countries for which data is available account for between 85 and 99 per cent 
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of total employment in trade and between 46 and 70 percent of total value added in 
trade.149  About half of those operating in the informal sector are poor, own-account 
operators.150  Some of the largest and fastest growing sectors in West African economies 
(wholesale and retail trade, transportation, restaurants, and construction) are dominated 
by informal firms, with retail trade being the largest of informal sector activities.151 
2.3 Nature of the Informal Sector 
The United Nations Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor report published in 
2008, ‘Making the Law Work for Everyone,’ states that ‘informality is here to stay and is 
an essential feature of the global economy.’152  The report also notes that lack of 
protection by the legal system renders micro-enterprises and their operators vulnerable 
and insecure.153  The vast majority of the informal sector workforce have never held a 
job in the formal sector and are often engaged in hereditary or traditional occupations.154  
A large segment of micro-operators in West Africa are highly mobile without a fixed 
work-place.155  On average, compared to formal workers, informal workers have lower 
earnings and face higher risks, are less likely to enjoy economic opportunities and legal 
protections, and are less able to exercise economic rights and collective voice.156  Micro-
operators cannot separate personal assets from business assets and they have difficulties 
offering secure collateral for loans.157  Therefore, access to formal sector credit is limited 
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or non-existent.158  Micro-operators opt for trading practices that minimise the potential 
for breach, and sales are thus made mostly on a cash-and-carry basis.159  The informal 
sector activities represent a survival strategy for the people involved.160  The more 
difficult the economic context, the more extensive the informal sector.161  The informal 
sector has not only grown in many countries but it has also emerged in new forms and 
places.162  Criminal activities (defined as those that operate illegally and deal in illegal 
goods and services) are only a small part of the entire informal economy, and most 
informal enterprises produce and distribute legal goods and services.163  Few micro-
enterprises operate in complete isolation from formal firms, and many have production or 
distribution relations with formal enterprises.164  The effects of globalisation, trade, and 
foreign direct investment on the informal sector are uncertain.165  Micro-enterprises rarely 
export.166  Street vending by small-scale traders is estimated to be the largest sub-sector 
of the informal sector, involving many thousands of traders in any major African city.167  
Because of relatively low barriers to entry and set-up costs, newcomers to the cities, 
including foreign migrants, opt for street trading as a means of survival.168   Street traders 
lack the security and advantages of a fixed location, including storage and access to 
sanitation and utilities, and are often subject to random restrictions and even ‘eviction’ by 
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governments.169  This ‘spatial informality’ makes street venders particularly 
vulnerable.170   
2.3.1 Social Networks 
The norms and institutions of the informal sector exert a powerful influence on how 
markets are organised in West African economies.171  Because of the relative absence of 
large corporations and public agencies in Africa, markets might even play a more 
prominent role in Africa than in more developed economies.172  But unlike the markets 
portrayed in standard economic theory, African markets operate amidst informal 
institutions that emphasise relationships and information sharing within communities and 
networks.173  Informality is not just about the failure to comply with legal regulations; it 
also necessitates the development of alternative organisational structures, which 
constitute ‘social networks’ or informal forms of economic organization.174  There is 
great diversity among African social networks (ethnic, religious, occupational) within a 
given society or region and across the continent.175  Although there are differing 
perspectives about the role of social networks, recent development studies have 
emphasised a positive, developmental role.176  Social networks are generally found to 
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engender trust and flexibility, reduce transaction costs, and facilitate integration into the 
global economy.177  They offer risk reduction and an ‘informal mechanism of economic 
coordination capable of filling gaps in formal institutions and regulatory capacity.’178  
But they are susceptible to breakdown or fragmentation in the face of instability in the 
wider economic context in which they operate.179  Overall social networks have failed to 
promote broader economic development in West Africa.180  Meagher argues that 
economic and political reforms, rapid economic expansion, and the lack of support from 
relevant state institutions have undermined African social networks, and their economic 
potential has been eroded by the pressures of liberalisation, globalisation, and political 
opportunism.181   
2.4 Informal Sector in West Africa 
 2.4.1 Networks and Cross-Border Trade 
Precolonial West Africa had the greatest indigenous economic development in Africa and 
there was relative unity in West African economies.182  Regularly scheduled and well-
organised markets were common in West Africa, involving intricate trade systems 
moving products from local markets to larger market systems throughout the region.183  
Today the informal sector actors in West Africa are predominately micro-enterprises, but 
these micro-enterprises co-exist with some large informal firms and well-developed 
trading networks.184  In Senegal, for example, one trader is estimated to control more than 
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a third of the imports of rice.185  Social and cultural settings play a prominent role in the 
spread of the informal sector in West Africa.  Ethnic and social/religious kinship groups 
are particularly significant in West Africa because of weak formal institutions and the 
continuing importance of kinship ties dating from the precolonial era.186  A major part of 
the informal sector in West Africa revolves around informal, cross-border trade (smuggling) 
to evade import barriers.187  The volume of unrecorded and untaxed trade between 
neighbouring countries in West Africa is very large.188  Many of the major smuggling 
enterprises are very large-scale operations in which kinship networks play a major role.189  
Kinship networks can have positive as well as negative effects on economic 
development.  On the one hand, group solidarity and mutual trust – by enabling contract 
performance, access to financing, and information exchange – can help expand commercial 
activities.190  On the other hand, kinship networks can be exclusionary, inefficient, and 
can even promote violation of the rules and norms of the formal economy.191  They often 
substitute for state provision of public goods and adhere to a set of informal norms of 
conduct and enforcement mechanisms.192  Traders belonging to such networks are 
unlikely to make a clear distinction between the norms governing their social relations 
and those applicable in business matters.193  
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 2.4.2 Ethnic and Kinship Groups:  Mouride and Yoruba. 
The ethnic and kinship groups in the region have specific defining commercial practices 
transmitted within families and the community.194  ‘[West] African trade . . . follows a 
system of networking in which each trading community has been for very long and so has 
a monopoly over a particular area or a specific product line.’195  Case studies of the 
Mourides in Senegal and the Yoruba in Benin illustrate the continuing importance of 
kinship trading networks that grew out of traditional African societies.196  The Mourides 
are a Muslim brotherhood originating in the nineteenth century and the Yoruba are an ethnic 
group predating the colonial era.197  Both groups rely on a hierarchical organizational structure 
and kinship ties, and the belief in Islam is a source of solidarity and motivation within both 
groups.198  The worldwide trading networks of the Mourides extend to Europe, Asia, and 
North America from Senegal and The Gambia, with their centre in the Sandaga market in 
Dakar.199  In addition to domestic commerce and international trade, Mourides dominate 
other sectors such as transport and real estate.200  For example, they own many the 
minivans that serve as the major mode of public transport (car rapides).201  Touba, the 
second largest city in Senegal, is the spiritual home of the Mouride and is de-facto a city-
state within Senegal.202  The Yorubas are one of the most populous and urbanised ethnic 
groups in sub-Saharan Africa, most of whom speak a common language (Yoruba).203  
Their traditional region encompasses the central areas of Benin and Togo and the 
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southwestern states of Nigeria, but has spread into Côte D’Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso, 
and Senegal, with their sphere of activity generally limited to West Africa where they 
tend to transact only with other Yoruba.204  The Yoruba play a leading role in smuggling 
between Nigeria and Benin and have been dominant in the re-export trade in most 
products.205  Yoruba traders are major players in the largest open-air market in West 
Africa –  Dantokpa market in Cotonou, Benin – which is a centre for regional cross-
border trade.206  The Dantokpa market, like Sandaga and other similar markets, is largely 
off-limits to the government.207  Allegiance to traditional sources of authority, such as the 
Yoruba chiefs and the Mouride marabouts, is often more powerful than the authority of 
the state.208    
2.5 Tontines 
One of the most important informal institutions that proliferate in West Africa is the local 
mutual aid association commonly called a ‘tontine.’209  The Yoruba and Mourides, for 
instance, have a well-developed system of tontines.210  These associations are known by 
various names depending on the specific functions of the association and local idiom.211  
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They serve both an economic and a social function.212  Tontines can be viewed as the 
embodiment of the African cultural value of mutual aid and cooperation.213  Since 
members are personally acquainted with each other, the economic status and 
creditworthiness of members are known by all.214  This peer monitoring requires a closely 
knit community with high levels of social cohesion and affiliation.215  Tontines are the 
predominant form of savings organization in the informal sector and provide a significant 
source of capital for micro-enterprises.216  The regular contributions are also a way of 
paying a type of insurance premium for the use of a social safety net.217  The social 
security function of tontines covers rites of passage, life cycle events, spiritual and 
religious ceremonies, education, and sometimes even insuring members and their 
relatives against the consequences of illness, accident, and death.218  Tontines are formed 
in neighbourhoods, by community, religious, or ethnic groups, or can be occupational or 
work-place based.219  They are autonomous institutions with voluntary participation, 
characterised by a high degree of self-sufficiency and self-regulation.220 Tontines 
facilitate social networking and information exchange.221  Tontines work, in part, because 
of intricate, strict rules of punctuality and procedure, observance of rituals, careful choice 
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of members, structured social relationships, and serious sanctions.222  In a tight-knit 
community with strong cultural ties social disapproval could mean banishment from the 
group and the end of access to credit.223  The effectiveness of this discipline can only be 
understood against the background of the comprehensive nature of financial and social 
links among members.224  Most significant changes in tontines are a result of the rapid 
evolution of urban tontines due to the influx of rural migrants, who have duplicated 
traditional village structures in the city to obtain some form of security and stability.225  It 
is estimated that more than 80 per cent of all rural migrants to cities belong to urban 
tontines.226  Even in urban areas tontines maintain strong links with their rural areas of 
origin.227  Funeral expenses are often borne by the tontine, to which every migrant must 
contribute on penalty of ostracism and loss of the right to burial in ancestral soil.228  
According to one researcher, in Douala, Cameroon ‘thousands of women, young people 
and unemployed could not survive without their tontine.’229  A tontine carries out four 
basic types of activities.230  One is the social security fund for emergencies and life cycle 
events with irregular, ad hoc contributions when the need arises.  The second is the 
Rotating Savings and Credit Association (‘ROSCA’).  The third is the Accumulating 
Savings and Credit Association (‘ASCRA’), a type of bank or credit union. The fourth 
activity is that of collective investment, such as a taxi or restaurant, with profits accruing 
to members.  There are also associations that are hybrids of these four basic activities. 
Lending is the primary function in both the ROSCA and the ASCRA.231  In addition to 
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access to credit, their economic benefits include lower transaction costs, accessibility, and 
flexibility.232  In a ROSCA, the pooled contributions are immediately redistributed.233    
In a ASCRA, pooled savings are and accumulated for a specified time, invested or lent 
out against interest, and then redistributed in whole or in part.234  The number of 
members in tontines varies considerably, from as few as a dozen or so to several hundred, 
depending on the type and purpose.235  The life-cycle of an ASCRA can extend into 
years, whereas the life-cycle of a ROSCA is usually only one year and not much 
longer.236   
2.5.1 Rotating and Savings Credit Associations 
Most tontines can be classed as ROSCAs.237  Despite their many variations, ROSCAs 
follow the same basic pattern.238  At the behest of a leader or organiser, a select group of 
people who share some common bond meet regularly and contribute a predetermined, 
fixed amount to a common fund.  The amount of this fund (or pot) is distributed 
periodically to each participant in turn on a rotating basis.  After the last member has 
received the pot, the ROSCA disbands or dissolves.  The number of participants, the 
regularity of meetings, and the amount of contribution are determined based on the needs 
of the group.239  In a simple or random ROSCA, everyone contributes the same amount at 
each meeting and receives the same size pot.  By the end of the ROSCA, everyone will 
have received, in lump sum, the total of their monthly contributions.  The consumer 
durable ROSCA is a slight variation on the random ROSCA and is popular among 
                                                 
232 Hevener op cit (n212) 20, 21. 
233 Bouman op cit (n211) 22-1. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid at. 22-2. 
236 Ibid. 
237 McKeever op cit (n209) 561. 
238 Hevener op cit (n212) 7. 
239 Ibid. The order of rotation can be determined in a number of ways, including by random assignment, or 





women, where instead of rotating a lump sum of funds, participants receive a physical 
good agreed upon by the group.240  Many ROSCA meetings involve ritualistic practices 
and social observances and also provide opportunities for networking.241  The primary 
benefit of a ROSCA is the accelerated access to capital or a commodity, since 
participants receive money or goods sooner as a result of their membership than if they 
were to save individually.242  ROSCA participants are motivated by considerations of 
social relationships and standing.243  Although the last receiving member derives no 
apparent economic benefit, she does receive social benefits since her membership is a 
step toward building her reputation to the point where she may credible enough to 
organise her own ROSCA.244  
2.6 Policy Implications 
Consideration of the complex and diverse informal sector in West Africa requires us to 
re-examine presumptions about the relationship between the informal sector and 
economic development – most significantly, the presumption that informality is 
necessarily an obstacle to development.  For many years the dominant view in the 
development field was that the informal sector was ‘symptomatic of pathology’ and the 
key to development was to formalise all micro-enterprises.245  A newer understanding of 
the informal sector views it as an adaptive response to existing realities and, in some 
respects, as being consistent with the evolution of traditional or customary institutions.246  
Consequently, the focus should not be on moving micro-enterprises from the informal to 
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the formal sector, but rather on creating for them an environment comparable to what 
enterprises in more developed economies enjoy.247  Local, informal institutions can 
contribute to a type and level of economic development compatible with local norms and 
practices.248  However desirable it might be, it is unlikely that most micro-enterprises can 
be formalised.249  The challenge is to decrease the costs and vulnerabilities of working 
informally and to increase the benefits of working formally.250  Supporting micro-
enterprises is a key to promoting growth and reducing poverty.251   Successful 
intervention requires multiple, back-up or complementary services.252  Micro-operators 
could be empowered through targeted capacity building, such as functional literacy and 
numeracy training programs.253  One criterion for policy intervention is to apply the 
‘principle of subsidiarity in a multi-level system,’ the key to which is to devolve authority 
to the lowest level that can take effective action related to the scale of a particular 
issue.254  Local communities can undertake many forms of collective action more 
effectively by drawing on their own evolved institutions, but for some purposes the 
appropriate level is national, regional, or even international.255  Another criterion is not to 
replace or ‘crowd out’ the informal rules and institutions of self-organised groups that are 
generally understood and relatively effective.256  For instance, reforms could seek to 
assist tontines and take lessons from their positive aspects rather than to replace them or 
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seek to integrate them into formal sector institutions.  The approach should be to promote 
policies and regulations that are ‘fit for purpose’ and accessible to micro-operators.257   
                                                 





CHAPTER THREE – OHADA AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
3.1 Overview of OHADA258 
OHADA is an international organization and a supranational system of business laws in 
West and Central Africa.259  There are now 17 nations that are signatories to the OHADA 
Treaty: Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Central African Republic, Mali, the Comoros, Burkina 
Faso, Benin, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Togo, Chad, the Republic of Congo, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Member 
States).  With a few exceptions, all are also members of the Franc-Zone, are French-
speaking, and have a civil law tradition.260  Member states of the African Union may join 
OHADA by acceding to the Treaty, and non-members of the African Union can be 
invited to join unanimously by OHADA Member States.261  OHADA is part of a larger 
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OHADA begins from the same premise as most rule of law projects, which is that laws 
must define and protect property rights and enforce contracts.263   As set forth in the 
Preamble to the 2008 Treaty, the goals of OHADA are 
. . .to make new progress towards African unity, and . . . to reinforce legal and judicial security 
in the [region], in order to guarantee a climate of trust that will contribute to making Africa a 
centre of development; [and] . . . to use the harmonisation of business law as an instrument to 
reinforce the rule of law, as well as legal and economic integration . . .. 264 
Article 1 of the consolidated Treaty states: 
The objective of the present Treaty is the harmonisation of business laws in the States Parties by 
the elaboration and adoption of ‘simple, modern common rules well adapted to their economies, 
by establishing appropriate judicial procedures, and by encouraging arbitration for the settlement 
of contractual disputes.265   
 
The articulated purpose of OHADA is to increase domestic and foreign trade and 
investment in and among Member States in order to enhance economic development in 
the region.266  The theory is that because of their uniformity, clarity, and accessibility the 
OHADA laws will reduce transactions costs and thus create an environment conducive to 
investment.267  OHADA laws focus only on enhancing the predictability of business 
transactions at the enterprise level, not on political economy or macroeconomic issues.268     
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3.2 Institutional Framework269 
OHADA is comprised of the following institutions: (1) the Council of Ministers; (2) the 
Permanent Secretariat headquartered at Yaoundé, Cameroon; (3) the Common Court of 
Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) headquartered at Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; (4) the Regional 
Training Centre for Legal Officers (Ecole Régionale Supérieure de la Magistrature, or 
ERSUMA) headquartered at Porto Novo, Benin; and, (5) the Conference of Heads of 
State and of Government.270  The Government of Senegal is the Depository Government 
for all Treaty instruments.271  The Council of Ministers, composed of the Ministers of 
Justice and Ministers of Finance of all the Member States, is the supreme decision-
making body of OHADA with both legislative and regulatory functions.  The Council 
may also request advisory opinions from the CCJA.  The Permanent Secretariat is the 
executive branch, managed and directed by a Permanent Secretary who represents 
OHADA and assists the Council of Ministers, including in the preparation and 
publication of the Uniform Acts.272  In its judicial capacity, the CCJA is the sole 
supranational court regarding interpretation of the Treaty and the Uniform Acts, and 
CCJA also has jurisdiction to render non-binding advisory opinions and interpretations.  
Judgments of national courts relating to OHADA law are subject to final appeal before 
the CCJA, whose decisions are final and binding, although enforcement is governed by 
national procedures.  The CCJA also acts as an arbitration centre.  The main role of 
ERSUMA is to improve the legal environment in the member states by providing training 
in OHADA law.  The Conference of Heads of State and of Government, composed of the 
heads of state of the member states, is a forum for dealing with political issues on any 
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question relating to the OHADA treaty.273  OHADA is funded from annual contributions 
paid by the Member States and also from aid from other international organizations and 
foreign states.274  OHADA was and remains largely funded by the French government.275   
3.2.1 Uniform Acts276 
In pursuance of its aims, OHADA has so far promulgated nine standard pieces of 
legislation on specific areas of business law called Uniform Acts (Acts).  The Acts cover 
general commercial law, commercial companies and economic interest groups, secured 
t ransactions, simplified debt collection and enforcement measures, bankruptcy, 
arbitration, accounting, carriage of goods by road, and cooperative companies.277  The  
Acts are directly applicable in all the Member States and supersede all national 
legislation on the same topic in each country.278  The Acts modernise the old, mostly 
French business laws previously applicable in Member States.279  With minor exceptions, 
they are basically ‘carbon copy’ transplants from French business law.280  Subject matter 
jurisdiction under OHADA is very broad, potentially covering any other subject related 
to business or commercial enterprise that the Council of Ministers unanimously decides 
to include.281 
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The Uniform Act on General Commercial Law (UA-GCL) provides the basic 
rules of business activity and covers subjects which do not fall within the ambit of the 
other more specific Acts, including the status of a commerçant (commercial operator, 
merchant, or trader), the commercial registry, the leasing of commercial premises, 
commercial intermediaries, the operation and sale of businesses (fonds de commerce), 
and the sale of goods.282  The provisions of the UA-GCL are applicable to every 
commercial operator or trader and economic interest group which has its place of 
business or registered office in any of the Member States.283  In addition, commercial 
operators must keep accounting books (journal, general ledger, and annual accounts 
ledger) and annual financial statements must be prepared in a form that complies with the 
provisions of the Uniform Act on Accounting Law.284  The Uniform Act on Secured 
Transactions (UA-ST) is designed to spur the flow of credit within the OHADA region 
and is a prime concern for foreign investors.285  The UA-ST governs the conditions under 
which securities must be registered, and in many cases a registration filing is required to 
perfect the security interest in order for it to be enforceable.286 
Revisions under the 2008 Treaty to the UA-ST and the UA-GCL made a few 
innovations that could assist micro-operators.287  Provisions were added in the UA-GCL 
creating a new category of commercial operator as an alternative to the commerçant, the 
‘entreprenant’ (enterpriser or individual entrepreneur), corresponding to the ‘auto-
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entrepreneur’ status introduced in France in 2008.288  The entreprenant, who is a natural 
person only, is not obligated to register on the trade and personal property registry, but is 
only required to complete a simple declaration at no cost at the local court register 
(greffe).289  When the revenues of the entreprenant exceed a specified amount, he or she 
must then perform all the formalities to operate as a commercial operator under the UA-
GCL and must be fully registered.290  It appears that there have been few registrations of 
entreprenants to date291  An innovation in the UA-ST was the pledge without 
dispossession on tangible assets, designed to use stock or any other means of production 
as collateral without depriving the grantor of the use of the pledged asset, which could 
provide much needed assistance to micro-enterprises in obtaining credit.292  (The most 
significant change to OHADA laws in regard to the informal sector is the addition of a 
Uniform Act on Cooperative Societies, which is discussed in Chapter 4.) 
3.2.1(a) Commercial Registry 
The provisions relating to the trade and personal property credit registry (Registre du 
Commerce et du Crédit Mobilier, or RCCM) are of particular importance to the OHADA 
reform effort and perhaps the most significant instance of OHADA’s ineffectiveness.293   
The principal function of the RCCM is to establish a centralised and computerised system 
of registration for commercial companies and operators and also for charges over 
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movable property.294  Centralisation of the data held in each local registry is to be 
organised in a national register held in each Member State and a regional register to be 
held by the CCJA.295  The RCCM is a key institution in the development of lending and 
is closely linked with the UA-ST.  Its purpose is to protect creditors and to provide 
businesses with important information for contracting purposes. A commercial entity 
acquires its separate legal personality only once it has been registered with the RCCM, 
which must be done within one month of establishing a business or incorporation, and 
failure to comply is a criminal offense.296  Yet no commercial registry as contemplated 
under OHADA exists in any Member State.297  Nor has any state created a proper vital 
records registry, which is essential for collateral registration.298  The absence of electronic 
or computerised records at local court registries and at the RCCM along with the 
disparate civil status registers hamper the credit environment.299  Making the RCCM 
operational is going to be a long term project, and it might prove to be an ‘illusory tool in 
the effort to increase legal certainty.’300   
3.3 Legal Certainty  
The foundational imperative of the OHADA reforms was the perceived need for legal 
and judicial certainty which, it was thought, could be obtained through a unified system 
of laws and legal institutions.301  The idea is that this new legal certainty and 
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predictability would create an environment more conducive to foreign investment.302  ‘As 
the drafters themselves expressed, the fact that these unified laws are based on Western 
legal norms reassures potential foreign investors.’303  The underlying rationale for legal 
unification is that the diversity of laws in the region is itself the primary cause of this 
uncertainty and the main obstacle to trade and economic development.304  There are 
several logical and empirical problems with this reasoning.  First, it is a dubious 
proposition that the diversity of laws among Member States was the cause of these 
countries being poor or economically under-developed.  Secondly, even if diversity of 
laws hinders development in some regard, what is needed is a better understanding of 
how diversity among specific laws is an impediment to particular aspects of 
development.  Thirdly, by creating a new, unified regime another dimension of legal 
diversity or pluralism has been created or intensified.  OHADA adds another layer of law 
– and thus uncertainty –  due to the possible jurisdictional overlap between OHADA and 
the other regional institutions involved in rulemaking related to economic matters.305  
Fourthly, it presumed that there are no benefits to legal pluralism and that legal pluralism 
can be eliminated.  In any event, positing diversity of laws itself as the principle cause of 
underdevelopment is a weak, unsupported justification for such a massive an expensive 
legal reform as OHADA.  
The present situation under OHADA may actually undermine more than promote 
legal certainty.306  As has been noted (supra 1.5.3), transplanted institutions create greater 
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legal uncertainty than do domestically developed solutions.307  Moreover, the attempt to 
bring uniformity of laws within a state may actually be one of the principal causes of 
conflict among laws and not a solution.308  The introduction of title registration systems 
to enhance property rights in Africa, for example, could result in greater uncertainty 
about those rights (supra 1.3.1).309  Paquin found that the flexible nature of contracting 
and the frequency of contractual violations among micro-enterprises in Dakar are caused 
by the uncertainty in the local business environment, and that the inefficiency of legal 
institutions did not account for the little use made of formal law mechanisms in the 
resolution of business disputes.310  Thus legal insecurity may have little to do with actual 
state of legal institutions.311  The micro-operators in Senegal, where a high value is 
attached to negotiation and compromise, tend to interpret contractual obligations as ‘good 
faith best efforts.’312   
3.4 Failure of OHADA to Address the Informal Sector 
Broadly speaking there are three types of challenges to law reform: 1) resource 
constraints, 2) cultural and social values, and 3) political economy issues.313  OHADA is 
negatively impacted by all three challenges.  This paper focuses on the second of these 
challenges.  There are many well-documented reasons for the ineffectiveness of 
OHADA, which include incomplete implementation, low utilization, jurisdictional and 
enforcement issues, poor dissemination and accessibility, inadequate funding, and 
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language barriers.314  While significant, these problems are primarily issues of political 
will and resource constraints.315  The failure of OHADA to address the informal sector is 
a more fundamental problem that cannot rectified by improvements in these other areas 
alone. The addition of the Uniform Act on Cooperative Societies in the 2008, some 15 
years after the original 1993 Treaty, is the first major reform directed specifically to the 
needs and realities of the informal sector, and although significant, does not change the 
overall institutional bias of the OHADA regime. Lack of understanding of the informal 
sector is a source of confusion and mistakes about how the economy actually 
functions.316  The focus on formalization downplays the role of the informal sector, 
which is often an economically productive one that can also provide security and 
reliability.317  OHADA is tailored for the activities and structures of formal sector 
companies, and not those operating in the informal sector.318  It is large, non-African 
companies, mostly French, who are the primary beneficiaries of the system.319  OHADA 
law is inaccessible to most people and is ill-suited to the needs of African society, and its 
purported benefits are illusory.320  It reflects rules and principles that are foreign or too 
abstract.321  It fails to take into account the existing legal pluralism in the region.  Except 
in a few limited situations, what OHADA offers is simply not relevant for micro-
enterprises.322  The Acts contain little evidence of any desire to integrate African norms 
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or values.323  Although some rules were adopted to the realities of the informal sector in 
the 2008 Treaty, such as the introduction of the entreprenant, little has been done to 
ensure that OHADA comprehensively addresses the challenges faced by micro-
operators.324  These are only piecemeal insertions whose application to those realities has 
yet to be seen.325  Since OHADA law is not adapted to, and often conflicts with, their 
practices and needs, it is not surprising that micro-operators do not seek its application.326  
OHADA highlights the gap and frequent conflict between economic behaviour and 
normative conduct on the ground and the formal business law on the books.327  This gap 
is widened by a strong and persisting oral tradition in the OHADA region.328  The 
framers of OHADA apparently assumed that the social and political institutions 
necessary for law reform already existed or that they were not important.329  In either case 
they were mistaken. 
3.4.1 Promoting Trade 
OHADA also does little to promote intra-African trade.330  To be fair, issues surrounding 
the existence of significant trade barriers in the region are outside OHADA’s ambit.  On 
the other hand, increased trade is one of its articulated objectives.331  The only direct 
method OHADA offers for increasing trade is by way of increased certainty in private 
business transacting resulting from its unified laws.  As a method of increasing trade it is 
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doubtful that such enterprise level predictability, although important, could ever trump 
the problems caused by trade barriers or other political and macroeconomic issues. 
3.4.2 Traditional Business Practices and Customary Laws 
OHADA reformers did not see any advantages to informal institutions in Africa as 
compared to formal law, and local customs were often thought to constitute impediments 
to the transformation of African society.332  Customary law is generally limited to 
domains such as marriage, succession, and land law.333  It is generally believed that 
customary laws are not geared to economic objectives, but only towards the preservation 
of the communal group and maintenance of peace.334   There is little recognition of 
indigenous business models, and OHADA fails to account for the informal manner in 
which commerce is conducted in the region.335  This failure seems particularly misguided 
or paradoxical since present day business practices and norms of micro-operators in the 
region are rooted in traditional norms and practices.336  There is a prevailing presumption 
that commercial activity is necessarily and rightly a subject over which state law has a 
monopoly.337  That presumption is an error.  As was noted (supra 1.7) customary laws 
represent entire ways of life for most Africans, including their economic activities.  
Although customary laws and modern commercial laws occupy separate domains, the 
two cannot be divorced.  Marital and succession laws can sometimes impact significantly 
on business matters as, for example, the consequence of divorce or death of key persons 
on the continuation or dissolution of closely-held or family-owned companies.  A more 
inescapable connection between customary laws and modern business laws is the status 
of real property.  For instance, under the UA-ST only a mortgage can serve as security 
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over real property when less than five percent of the land in the region is registered.338  
The rights in real property in Africa are predominantly controlled by customary land 
tenure systems and largely remain untitled.  Even if the land were to be titled in a 
standard manner, as a practical matter, the rights of the community in the land could 
effectively place a cloud over the title.339  At the same time, the sudden introduction of 
title registration systems into contexts with recognised customary rules about property 
has significant social implications (supra 1.3.1).340     
3.5 Development through OHADA 
The concept of development ‘almost becomes a mockery’ in the circumstances that exist 
in African economies today.341  There has been no ‘systematic attempt to deal with the 
crisis of African underdevelopment’ and Africa is becoming increasingly marginalised 
within the global economic system.342  Only about 10 percent of the trade within Africa is 
intra-African, which is the lowest level of any region in the world.343  Any economic 
growth has been ‘more affected by commodity prices than any improvement in 
institutional frameworks.’344  For almost all OHADA countries, per capita national 
product is less than U.S. $700 per year.345  Given these realities, it is striking how little 
attention is given to development in the OHADA reforms, especially since economic 
development is purportedly the end goal.  OHADA’s economic development strategy is 
still ‘haunted by colonial spirits’ in so much as it primarily serves French and other 
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foreign interests and is based on Western norms.346  Although often touted as pro-
development, there is nothing in the Treaty or in the Acts that states that the goals of 
OHADA include the development of the people or countries in the region.347  In fact, the 
term ‘development’ only appears once in the Treaty ambiguously as ‘centre of 
development.’348  Whatever a ‘centre of development’ might mean, the concept does not 
support the rhetoric about economic development in Member States. There is no 
reference to anything demonstrating how these reforms might cause development to 
occur.  Clearly development within the OHADA region takes a back seat to other 
objectives.349  A December 2013 Report to the French Minister of Economy and Finance, 
for instance, notes that OHADA ‘is an undervalued shared asset, that once mastered, can 
offer France a strong and open advantage vis-à-vis “Anglo-Saxon” investors, as well as 
English-speaking and emerging Africans.’350  The ultimate prize is foreign investment 
which, one is left to assume, definitely and automatically generates economic 
development.351  The terms ‘foreign investment’ and ‘development’ are often conflated, 
and the casual connection from foreign investment to increased local development seems 
to be taken for granted.  OHADA implicitly endorses the concept of ‘development-
through-foreign investment,’ although there is little evidence to support it.352  The 
premise that legal reform will necessarily increase foreign investment is contested as is 
the premise that foreign investment necessarily leads to local economic development. 
3.5.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
One pillar of law and development doctrine is the belief that improvements in the legal 
institutions in a host country will lead to an increase in the inflow of foreign direct 
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investment (FDI) into that country.  This belief is based upon the theory that investors are 
attracted to states with effective legal systems –  those which implement laws efficiently 
and predictably.353  Underlying this theory is the assumption that economic actors 
structure their activities in order to reduce transaction costs, which are said to arise 
through the inefficient or unpredictable enforcement of laws.354  Although this theory 
predicts that foreign investors should be attracted to states with effective legal systems 
there is little empirical evidence to suggest that they are so attracted.355  The ability of a 
state to improve FDI inflows is likely constrained by the characteristics of investors, who 
may be ‘insensitive’ to the effectiveness of legal systems.356  It appears that the 
nationality of an investor, the size of the investment, and whether an investor is export-
oriented could be factors which determine the sensitivity of foreign investors to 
endogenous legal reform.357  In addition, many economic actors depend upon 
mechanisms outside the formal legal system to structure and implement their economic 
activities, which might not be justifiable on a transaction cost analysis.358  Whether FDI 
inflows would have a positive impact on development depends on other variables.  
Investment in relatively labour-intensive industries will likely lead to more job creation 
and local growth than investment in capital-intensive industries.359  In Africa, the 
majority of FDI inflow has been in the capital-intensive, extractive sector, so it is unlikely 
to have significant impact on employment generally and in the informal sector in 
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particular.360  Another variable is the type of subcontracting or other linkages the 
investment will have in either the formal or informal sector.  If the investment requires 
linkages with local suppliers, for instance, then FDI could have a positive impact.361 
3.5.2 Impact Studies 
No comprehensive study has been carried out to date on the impact of OHADA law on 
economic development or investment in the region.362  There does not appear to be any 
empirical evidence that OHADA has had any beneficial effect on the economies of the 
Member States.363  But there is data to suggest that there has been no positive impact.  
The results of one quantitative study about the effects of OHADA on growth and 
development were sobering.364  The author concluded that OHADA member states did 
not perform better overall than non-member states in the post-implementation period.365  
A legal case study indicates that OHADA formal laws do not have a significant impact 
on entrepreneurs in Cameroon.366  Based on her research in the region, Deschamps 
concludes that OHADA laws ‘have either little, none, or adverse effects’ on the micro-
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operators in the region.’367  The annual ‘Doing Business Report,’ published since 2004 by 
the World Bank, is sometimes cited as evidence of the success of OHADA, but the 
Report is very narrow in scope and only tangentially relates to OHADA reforms, 
comparing sub-Saharan Africa as whole to other global regions.368 
3.6  Recommendations: A Functional Approach 
Enterprises in more developed economies generally benefit from legal structures in all 
phases of the business life-cycle, as well as from non-legal support structures, such as 
transportation, communications, electricity, and sanitation.369  Such cumulative and 
complementary assistance undergirds the economy in more developed countries and 
provides predictability, but is often overlooked or taken for granted in analysing the role 
of law in facilitating business.370  The challenge is to determine how similar structures 
could help micro-enterprises obtain functionally equivalent support in the African 
context.  It is the functionality (not necessarily the form) of these laws and structures that 
African countries need to replicate in their own economies.371  A functional approach to 
law reform is focused on outcomes rather than process and formality, shifting the 
emphasis from standardisation of mechanisms to functionality, responsiveness, and 
adaptability.372 
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OHADA has so far succeeded in doing little more than modernising and unifying 
(mostly on the books only) disparate national laws from countries operating historically 
with the same (French) legal system.373  It has not been shown to be successful in 
promoting micro-enterprise activity or alleviating poverty in Member States.  Contrary to 
its stated objective to be ‘adaptable’ to the economic realities of the region, OHADA, as a 
whole, is not adapted to the reality of the informal sector.  While foreign investment is an 
essential source of funds, a fundamental change in social institutions to encourage 
domestic economic development is equally critical.374  What is needed is a pluralistic 
legal framework – not a positivist approach – that is responsive to the needs of micro-
enterprises.  In some matters the formal law should defer to local informal law.  Further 
reforms need to include the interests of those who were previously marginalised in the 
formulation and administration of existing policies and institutions.375  Model laws or 
legislative guides might be more appropriate tools in future reforms.376  OHADA 
constituents must be more broadly and inclusively conceived of and attended to, and the 
highly diverse and socially-oriented nature of African people and societies must be taken 
into consideration.377  The objective should be to promote needs-based commercial law 
reform in the region that is attuned to local practices and that allows citizens to play a 
more effective part in their own development and to best effectuate the human agency 
function.378  Facilitating the operation of local businesses would lead to more successful 
sustainable development.379  Micro-enterprises need access to credit, to subcontracting 
links with the formal sector, and to export markets.  The creation of reliable and well-
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functioning commercial registries would be a good step in providing the accurate 
information about operators or enterprises that is needed for firms to initiate relationships 
and to properly assess transactional risk.380  The disadvantages stemming from the 
limited size of the local market and limited access to a larger pool of partners could be 
reduced by facilitating access to foreign and regional markets through the establishment 
of collaborative partnerships between local or regional micro-enterprises and foreign 
firms.381  Associations and networks that help micro-operators develop their capacities 
and also to better understand formal laws could be promoted or at least allowed to form 
and operate without undue interference.  The intent is to build bridges between the formal 
and informal and have a ‘composite law’ that is well-suited to African realities.382   
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CHAPTER FOUR – LINKING OHADA AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
4.1 Mediation 
Another area where OHADA missed an opportunity to reflect African values was in the 
selection of arbitration as the sole alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism to the 
exclusion of mediation.  As many as 90 percent of day-to-day disputes are said to be 
resolved through non-state systems such as traditional authorities.383  The most common 
conclusion in legal research is that the dysfunction of the courts themselves causes there 
to be so little recourse to formal dispute mechanisms, but another possibility is that the 
methods being imposed do not fit with local realities and traditional practices.384  The 
essential role of courts is to provide effective dispute resolution fora for constituents, but 
OHADA fails in this role.  Arbitration under OHADA is designed for large commercial 
enterprises.  It is not really suitable for most Africans and micro-operators.  The 
arbitration process is impersonal and removed from people’s experiences and 
communities – culturally and geographically.  Traditional tribunals draw upon local, 
customary norms rather than state norms to resolve disputes and usually strive to reach 
consensual outcomes.385  Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are more locally 
based, as is formal mediation.  Mediation is less formal, less expensive, and is more 
flexible than arbitration.  In the mediation process, as in traditional African dispute 
resolution processes, when conflicts are resolved they are ultimately settled by agreement 
between or among parties.  Mediators, likely experienced or respected members of the 
local communities, facilitate the process and nudge parties toward an agreement, but they 
don’t impose a solution as does an arbitrator or arbitration panel. And intermediation by 
attorneys would not be required in mediation as it is under OHADA arbitration.   By 
incorporating mediation into OHADA judicial reform, local actors would be involved, 
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and thus settlements more likely to be respected.  In this way, the judicial process would 
be more integrated into the daily lives of informal sector actors.  With mediated 
settlement agreements there is – theoretically, if not practically –  enforcement recourse 
to the courts if necessary.  But this is different than an arbitral award which is imposed 
and enforceable as judgment.  In mediation the parties are not forced to settle, nor is a 
judgment (award) imposed on them as in arbitration.  The essential feature of a mediated 
settlement agreement, as with results under customary law tribunals, is that it represents 
an acceptable rule for the situation at hand in the minds of all participants so that a 
common feeling of justice prevails.386  Mediation is ultimately about conciliation of 
competing demands.  By omitting the conciliatory process and nature of mediation, 
OHADA fails to allow for the development of human agency through local stakeholder 
participation.  Conciliation of disputes and conflicts over competing interests is a 
necessary step in the development of people’s capacity to govern themselves. The 
process and mechanics of the OHADA arbitration process sterilises that important work. 
This is an instance where the OHADA legal reforms should have been more attuned to 
customary law and practices.  Mediation could be incorporated into the OHADA regime 
consistent with local or customary norms.  Formal mediation could be built upon or 
complement traditional dispute resolutions mechanisms and local tribunals. If the 
mediation process were formalised and adopted by local constituents it might also 
improve the reception of other OHADA laws.  It would be a bridge between OHADA 
and the informal sector.   
4.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
OHADA formal law could reach the informal sector if it incorporated into its norms a 
conception of corporate social responsibility (CSR) based on a stakeholder theory in 
corporate law and governance.  According to the evolving stakeholder theory, a company 
must consider a range of interests, and not only the shareholders (owners), in its decision-
                                                 





making and its business operations.387  If a broad conception of CSR were adopted and 
integrated into OHADA law, larger formal enterprises might be required to address local 
conditions and institutions and to contribute to sustainable economic and social 
development.388  The United Nations, for instance, encourages regional organizations 
such as OHADA to introduce the necessary institutional and legal mechanisms to 
promote the adoption of CSR practices by enterprises in regard to sustainable 
development.389  One such mechanism would be for the Conference of Heads of State 
and of Government or the Council of Ministers to implement CSR provisions 
supplemental to business laws or to adopt a charter with CSR guidelines for the OHADA 
region.390  The basis for a robust conception of CSR may already exist, however, under 
OHADA corporate law in the concept of intérêt social. 
4.2.1 Intérêt Social 
 Under French law, the goal of the corporation is to respect the intérêt social (translated 
as ‘social interest’ or ‘corporate interest’), which is a flexible, stakeholder-oriented 
conception of corporate governance.391  The majority view is that corporate interest is 
expansive and includes all the interests of the corporation as a whole, even the interests of 
third parties that have contracted with the corporation, including employees, creditors, 
suppliers, and customers.392  The concept was already present in the French corporate law 
that existed in the region before OHADA, and OHADA appears to have adopted the 
stakeholder oriented conception of corporate interest.393  If this conception were to be 
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fully embraced, OHADA norms of CSR could include affirmative obligations to provide 
various services to those whom its operations affect, including those operating in the 
informal sector.394  Corporate interest would then require balancing the perceived needs 
of potential investors with the interests of the citizens and local communities in the 
region.395  An expansive concept of corporate interest would be consistent with 
OHADA’s purported aim to enhance the region’s development.  Moreover, a concept of 
corporate interest (or CSR) that values the entire community would be consistent with 
traditional African norms and customs. 
4.3 Pro-Development Formal Law 
Legal systems can be distinguished by the function law plays in support of economic 
activity.396  The clear allocation and protection of property rights is only one possible 
function.397  Another is the coordinating function of law where the focus is on the 
designation of actors with a right to participate in processes in which rights will be 
affected.398  According to Milhaupt, the ‘protective’ and ‘coordinative’ functions of law 
coexist, and the dominance of one or the other distinguishes legal systems.399  As we saw 
in Chapter 3, OHADA laws are focused on the protective function.  This chapter looks at 
how OHADA could play a coordinative function.  Dickerson argues that formal laws can 
be pro-development within the informal sector if they (1) impose ‘function-enhancing 
obligations’ on formal-sector actors who interact with micro-enterprises in the informal 
sector, and (2) ‘facilitate coordinative behaviour’ among informal sector actors in a 
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manner compatible with pre-existing norms.400  These two roles are separate but related.  
If coordination among micro-enterprises is facilitated, they are then in a position to make 
more credible demands on formal sector actors or government agents.  At the same time, 
micro-operators who are the beneficiaries of obligations imposed on formal sector actors, 
will likely be in a better position to organise and coordinate their own efforts. 
4.3.1 Function enhancing obligations 
Some of these sorts of ‘function-enhancing obligations’ could be derived from an 
expansive concept of corporate social responsibility (supra 4.2).  Function-enhancing 
obligations would have to be imposed on government agents or private, formal sector 
actors.  One example could be the provision of a standardised commercial lease for 
micro-enterprises for stalls or other space, which might also contain terms requiring basic 
sanitation, water, and electricity.401  Such a standardised lease could reduce the costs of 
entering into lease agreements and possibly minimizing subsequent disputes.402  In 
addition, regulations at the state or local level could require decent workspace for street 
traders and vendors, both in terms of permanence, storage facilities, and location 
desirability.403  Another benefit of the provision of these basic support structures or 
function-enhancing obligations is that micro-enterprises would then need less capital.404   
4.3.2 Facilitating Coordinative Behaviour 
Formal law can play a coordinative role by supporting existing informal networks and 
associations and by facilitating the creation and support of formal cooperatives.405  
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Cooperatives have great potential for coordinating self-help action.406 Cooperative 
structure tracks local networking norms and is consistent with the principle of 
subsidiarity.407  The creation of a strong, autonomous cooperative sector would be a 
catalyst to the coordinative role of formal law.  OHADA formal law provides such a 
vehicle in the Uniform Act on Cooperative Societies (UA-CS).408     
4.4 Uniform Act on Cooperative Societies 
In 2002, the International Labour Conference of the ILO adopted the Promotion of 
Cooperatives Recommendation (No. 193), a set of non-binding guidelines which provides 
a modern framework for cooperatives.409  The Recommendation incorporates the 1995 
International Statement of Cooperative Identity and the cooperative principles of the 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA).410  Since its adoption, over 100 countries have 
used Recommendation No. 193 to revise and develop their cooperative policies and laws, 
and it was followed in the creation of the UA-CS.411  Cooperative are based on the values 
of self-help, individual-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity.412  The 
core principles of cooperatives are: 
1. Voluntary, open membership;  
2. Democratic member control 
3. Member economic participation 
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4. Autonomy and Independence 
5. Education, Training and Information 
6. Cooperation among Cooperatives 
7. Concern for the Community413 
 
The UA-CS deals only with the structure and general governance of the cooperative 
and not specific rules regarding the activities of the cooperatives.414 The Act emphasises 
the notion of a ‘common bond’ shared by co-operators related to a profession, an 
identity of purpose, an activity, or legal form.415  If the activity of the cooperatives 
requires a grant of authorisation from a regulatory body, then that activity is 
governed by the applicable rules of the authorising agency.416  However, banking and 
financial cooperatives’ activities are explicitly made subject to national and regional 
laws.417 The Act grants ample freedom to co-operators in establishing by-laws and the 
flexibility to allow cooperatives to incorporate local or national traditions that fit with 
the concrete needs of the specific population.418 
The definition of a cooperative is taken directly from Recommendation 193:  
. . . an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and 
democratically controlled enterprise according to the cooperative principles.419  
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An entity could be a ‘cooperative’ as defined above without technically being a 
‘cooperative society’ in accordance with the UA-CS.  The seven ICA cooperative 
principles listed above are restated in the UA-CS, and the principles must be included 
in the by-laws along with the agreement of the members to comply with them.420 
Each co-operator has one vote regardless of the size of her shareholding or starting 
date of her membership.421  Under the Act, cooperatives are comprised of three 
bodies: a general meeting, a management body (committee or board of directors), 
and a supervisory committee or supervisory board.422  The general meeting, which 
includes all co-operators, is the decision-making body, and its decisions are 
recorded.423  Any person wishing to join a cooperative must apply in writing and be 
approved by the general meeting.424 
The UA-CS creates two kinds of cooperative companies: a simplified 
cooperative and cooperative with a board of directors.425  The cooperative only 
obtains its juristic personality after it has been registered with a Register for 
Cooperatives (based on the model of the RCCM), which must be done within one 
month of incorporation.426    Share capital is the contribution made by co-operators 
which can be in cash, in kind, or in industry, and is reimbursed when a member leaves 
the cooperative, usually at a nominal value.427    Cooperatives must establish a 
general reserve and a reserve for training and education on cooperative principles, 
which are not distributable.428  Payment of patronage refunds can only be considered 
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after the legal reserves are established.429   
Mergers can only occur between cooperatives either by creating a new 
cooperative or through absorption.430  Cooperatives can be converted from one type 
of cooperative (simplified or with a board) to the other only without having to change 
the cooperative legal form.431  A conversion from a cooperative to another corporate 
form requires the dissolution of the existing cooperative and the creation of a new 
legal entity.432  The reserves of the cooperative remain non-distributable.433  The 
causes of dissolution are much the same as under company law.434  However, upon 
liquidation, the assets of the cooperative must be allocated to other cooperatives, 
institutions, or organisations working to promote the cooperative movement.435 
Cooperatives can be integrated into umbrella cooperatives at three different 
levels: unions (two or more cooperatives), federations (two or more unions), and 
confederations (two or more confederations).436  These umbrella organisations 
function much like primary cooperatives and, in the absence of specific provisions, 
are governed by the same general rules as cooperatives with boards of directors.437  
UA-CS has established a new level of integration – ‘cooperative networks of 
resources and objectives’ – which can operate transnationally to implement any 
means to facilitate, improve, or develop the activity of their members or to promote 
cooperative principles.438   
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There remains a problem regarding other organisations that resemble 
cooperatives (e.g. mutual societies, tontines, rural associations) and that might be 
regulated under national laws but which are not qualified technically as cooperatives 
under UA-CA.439  This raises question regarding the abrogation of national laws 
governing these institutions and whether these other institutions can or must be 
converted to formally compliant cooperatives.440  Another problem is the creation of 
a functioning Register for Cooperatives, which suffers from the same issues as the 
does the establishment of the RCCM (supra 3.2.1a), namely, it doesn’t exist.441  This 
is all complicated by the fact that any person who uses the legal form of a cooperative 
must comply with the UA-CS, subject to criminal liability for failing to do so.442 
4.5 Scope and Characteristics of Cooperatives 
Cooperatives are significant economic force in nearly every developed country and 
have been major contributors to economic growth and poverty alleviation.443  In 
many countries cooperatives are among the largest enterprises in diverse fields, 
including agriculture, savings and credit, rural electricity, insurance, housing, and 
renewable energy.444  Membership in cooperatives is estimated to be nearly one billion 
with another 100 million directly employed by cooperatives, and 2,000 cooperatives 
in 56 countries have a total turnover of US$ 2,578.5 billion.445  There are three times as 
many member-owners as there are individual shareholders in investor-owned enterprises 
worldwide.446  Unfortunately, results have been much less impressive in less-developed 
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countries.447   
The cooperative is a distinctly modern form of business, not a peripheral or 
culturally limited form of organisation.448  Cooperatives are commonly much more 
closely controlled by their member-owners than are investor-owned firms, but control in 
a cooperative is broadly diffused among its members.449  A cooperative is generally 
dependent on economies of scale.450  Ownership of a cooperative is rarely shared by a 
group of patrons that exhibits any substantial diversity because the costs of collective 
decision-making are very high for a heterogeneous group of owners.451  Cooperative 
philosophy emphasises local responsiveness, decentralised decision making, participation 
and involvement, and local generation and distribution of wealth.452  The essential 
characteristic of a cooperative is that it is a democratic organization providing goods and 
services in the market place with the purpose of bringing sustainable prosperity to its 
members.453  Cooperatives are locally created and embedded voluntary and participatory 
associations whose members share a group identity and rely on local capital 
mobilization.454  Ownership and control by members is a key aspect of cooperatives 
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and members are the prime beneficiaries of the cooperative enterprise.455  Cooperatives 
differ from other forms of commercial enterprise in that their owners invest in order 
to create a business that will benefit them through their patronage, not from a return 
on their equity.456  Surplus revenues are returned to members proportionate to their 
trade with the cooperative (patronage refunds), reinvested in the cooperative, or used to 
provide additional member services.457  
Most cooperatives in Africa are related to agricultural activities, but savings and 
credit cooperatives are the second largest and fastest growing cooperative sector and may 
be the predominant form of micro-finance institution in Africa.458  Established 
cooperatives often expand into ancillary services directly related to the core business of 
the cooperative, such as storage and packaging, and some seek expansion into the fields 
of insurance, credit, education and training, or medical services.459  In addition to the 
more traditional producer, worker, and consumer cooperatives, the range of areas covered 
by cooperatives in Africa includes housing, transport, tourism, recreation, basic 
infrastructure, mining, and handicrafts and other cottage industries. 460  Cooperatives are 
often linked to social movements focused on poverty alleviation, social justice, and 
environmental issues.461  Participation in the Fair Trade Movement provides small 
producers an opportunity to participate in the global economy, especially trade in coffee, 
cocoa, cotton, and organic produce.462  Cooperatives can also take advantage of 
intellectual property, particularly trademarks on their products.463   
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4.5.1 Cooperatives and Traditional Institutions 
Modern cooperatives are similar to organisations of community and solidarity in 
Africa rooted in traditional social hierarchies, such as village associations and 
tontines, and they work best when the norms and values they rely on are congruent with 
those traditional systems.464  Unlike the modern cooperative form, however, these 
traditional systems do not have built-in mechanisms for expansion or growth and in most 
cases are event or hazard related and mobilised only on an ad hoc basis.465  The 
cooperative form provides a new framework that reinforces and complements these 
traditional mutual support institutions.466  Cooperatives often create ancillary mechanisms 
to handle expenses related to wedding, illness, death or funerals that are similar to the 
solidarity mechanisms  common to most African communities.467 
     4.5.2 Development through Cooperatives 
Cooperatives build social capital, which consists of all those aspects of social 
organization (institutions, relationships, attitudes, norms, and values) which govern 
and shape interactions and facilitate cooperation amongst the members of a 
community.468 Cooperatives bring critical social services to their communities, 
generate economies of scale, increase efficiencies and access to information, improve 
the quality and value added to products, increase access to capital, and create 
bargaining power or leverage.469  Cooperatives instil democratic values through 
member control, participatory management, devolution of power, self-reliance, and 
collective action, and they also provide opportunities for improvement of conflict 
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management skills, all of which can contribute to the enhancement of civil society.470  
Cooperatives can offer these advantages whether or not they are incorporated under 
formal law.  However, eventual formalization would be desirable for cooperatives to 
grow and remain sustainable. 
Transformational development (the enhancement of human capability) requires 
fundamental changes in economic structures, governance, and institutions.471    The 
wealth generation and social inclusion that cooperatives help foster is critical for 
transformational development.472  Cooperatives are ‘the only form of organization 
meeting so fully all the dimensions of poverty alleviation as summarised by the 
World Bank: opportunity; empowerment and security.’473  Cooperatives contribute to 
transformational development through three primary pathways:  economic (alleviating 
poverty, stimulating economic growth); democratic (providing a framework for 
democratic participation); and, social (building social capital and trust).474  
‘Cooperatives represent one of the few options that [micro-enterprises] have for surviving 
in a more concentrated and integrated global environment.’475  They can consolidate the 
solidarity-based networks already existing in the informal sector to help ensure that 
communities can withstand and address the instabilities caused by globalisation.476 
Cooperatives can have both an ameliorative and a transformative function.477  
Cooperatives can help micro-operators organise for effective political action and to have 
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a voice and the political power to demand better government-provided structures and 
services.478  Highlighting the contribution of cooperatives to socio-economic 
development, the UN declared 2012 as the International Year of Cooperatives (IYC).479  
Building on that success, ICA developed the ‘Blueprint for a Co-operative Decade,’ 
which states that by 2020 the cooperative form of business will be the acknowledged 
leader in economic, social, and environmental sustainability, the model preferred by 
people, and the fastest growing form of enterprise.480 
4.6 Cooperative History in West Africa 
The cooperative sector in Africa was introduced by colonial authorities with few, if any, 
institutional links with indigenous or traditional systems, such as tontines in West 
Africa.481  A social economy model took root in many francophone countries, where 
groupements collectifs, association villageois, mutuelles, producer groups, and other 
cooperative-type of organizations were promoted.482  The French opted for direct 
intervention in the organization and administration of local structures in West Africa, 
which were managed by colonial civil servants and had a large territorial base beyond the 
local level.483  Cooperative development in West and Central Africa displayed negative 
path dependence in continually being tied to the export crop strategy, where cooperatives 
were used instrumentally in the production of crops for export on behalf of colonial state 
authorities, and whereby governments became the prime patron of the cooperatives.484  
Cooperatives in colonial Africa were ‘merely functional appendages’ of these semi-
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public agencies used for propagating public policy.485  Members were not the owners of 
the cooperatives and membership was often compulsory.486  Post-independence 
governments intensified and extended government involvement in cooperative 
development and reinforced this negative path by making cooperatives sub-contractors, 
agents, or affiliates of government controlled marketing boards.487  As a result, the 
cooperative sector lost its voluntary character completely and became subject to political 
and ideological imperatives.488  By the end of the twentieth century, governments and 
donors largely withdrew from the cooperative sector.489 
4.7 Challenges for Cooperatives  
Statistics about African cooperatives are scarce, and the extent and the significance of the 
African cooperative movement is unknown.490  The penetration rate (cooperative density) 
is estimated to be only 7 per cent of the total population, but differences among countries 
is significant.491  One of the main reasons for the scarcity of data on cooperatives is the 
low participation of African cooperatives in international apex organizations.492  The 
number of cooperatives recorded in the data may be skewed higher because of the variety 
of business models in the region recognised as group-based economic organisations that 
could be counted as cooperatives.493  The impact of cooperatives on poverty reduction in 
Africa has not been studied systematically, but it appears that the general economic 
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significance of the cooperative sector has been limited.494   
The first step in the creation of a strong, autonomous cooperative sector in the 
economies of West Africa is overcoming the negative legacy described above.  A major 
challenge to successful cooperative development (which the UA-CS partly 
addresses) has been the lack of an enabling legal and regulatory environment and 
supportive institutions that promote cooperatives as private sector businesses.495 
Another challenge is for cooperative members to remain the primary beneficiaries of 
group action for which they originally organised.496  In addition, the multiple purposes of 
cooperatives – making profits, providing services, and realising meaning – are often in 
tension.497  Another concern is the status of cooperative-like organisations that are not 
included in the UA-CS or cooperatives that are not formalised, since we do not want to 
crowd out or diminish existing institutions that are adequately serving the needs of 
informal sector actors.  Organisations can function in accordance with the cooperative 
principles without being formalised as cooperatives under the UA-CS.  In many instances 
a less formal structure may provide a more flexible and appropriate organisational form 
for collective action. 
Cooperatives are strengthened and serve their members most effectively by 
working together through local, regional, national, and international structures to form a 
more integrated cooperative sector.498  These secondary and tertiary structures (vertical 
and horizontal) bring greater benefits of economies of scale and leverage and better 
access to markets.499  The importance of cooperative networks is reflected in the UA-CS 
articles on unions, federations, and confederations (supra 4.4).  There has not been much 
integration in the cooperative sector in Africa, which historically has been fragmented 
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and overly dependent on outside patrons.500  As a consequence, the voice of the 
cooperative constituency has been underrepresented.501   
The UA-CS is likely subject to many of the same implementation issues plaguing 
OHADA as whole.  However, unlike the bulk of OHADA law, the UA-CS is directly 
applicable to micro-operators and other actors in the informal sector.  The structure and 
principles of cooperatives have been derived over many years from the experiences and 
aspirations of marginalised groups all over the world. Notwithstanding its formal 
requirements, the UA-CS is flexible and can accommodate the various contexts and 
needs of potential members.  Micro-operators should be enticed to move toward 
formalisation as their understanding and appreciation of the benefits of formality evolve 
over time.  It would seem the best thing would be to make formalisation optional, and not 
mandatory. Cooperatives complement and are reflective of traditional West African 
norms and institutions, and they are consistent with a human capability concept of 
development.  Although the cooperative form is important, it is the substance of the law 
as embodied in the cooperative principles that is more significant.    Ultimately, 
widespread adoption and use of the UA-CS could perform a signalling function for 
micro-operators throughout the regions as to the benefits of formality in conducting 
business.   
4.8 Reintegration 
One aspect of modern legislative action throughout Africa, including OHADA, is an 
attempt to restore a measure of ‘re-integration’ in contemporary African society.502  Allot 
describes the process of ‘dis-integration’ of African societies this way: 
[T]raditional [African] societies, though in continuous evolution, were integrated societies.  
There was an intimate connection in each society between its religion, moral code, and system of 
thought, its social manners and conventions, its modes of economic activity, its family or social 
structure and its legal system.  This integration was damaged, and eventually shattered, by the 
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arrival of colonial rule and imposition of colonial law, followed by the penetration of European 
ideas, activities, and institutions.  This disintegration within the local indigenous society was 
repeated higher up the scale, at the territorial level:  there was little or no real unity of thought or 
purpose between those who happened to find themselves within the same territorial boundary.503   
 
In addition, there was a gradual abandonment of a community-centred approach to 
life in favour of individualism.504  Writing shortly after the time of independence, 
Allott saw the movement towards unification of laws in Africa in optimistic terms as 
the expression in legal terms of this reintegration effort.505  However, unification of 
laws was to occur in stages -- first, harmonisation, then then integration, and finally 
unification.506  
[H]armonization is . . . the reconciliation of contradictory elements between the rules and 
effects of two or more legal systems which continue in force as self-sufficient bodies of law. . 
.. [I]ntegration is . . . the making a new legal system by the combining of separate legal 
systems into a self-consistent whole. . ..  [The combined legal systems may remain sources of 
law], but they cease to be self-sufficient autonomous systems. . . .. [U]nification is . . . the 
creation of a new, uniform, legal system entirely replacing the pre-existing legal systems, 
which no longer exist, either as self-sufficient systems or as bodies of rules incorporated in the 
larger whole . . ..507 
A crucial attribute of harmonisation is that it presupposes and preserves the 
diversity of the objects harmonised.508  True harmonisation would respect the legal 
pluralism in the region, whereas forced unification is antithetical to pluralism.  No 
real effort at harmonisation of laws seems to have ever been undertaken in Africa.509  
Legal reforms, such as OHADA, seek to unify laws without working through earlier, 
conciliatory stages of harmonisation and integration.  Moreover, these uniform laws 
have been imposed from outside sources rather than developed internally.  For Allot, 
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it is a question of finding an alternative new law which reconciles and unifies 
existing laws –  when they are as various as customary law on the one hand and 
modern commercial law on the other.510  The key element in finding this alternative 
new law is the process itself of accommodation and reconciliation.  The goal is to re-
establish broken harmony through a collective process leading to reconciliation.511  
Integration through forced unification of laws short-circuits the necessary process of 
the conciliation of laws and peoples.  The social and political conditions necessary 
for unification must first exist.  Law reform should create a space where there is 
common ground to move toward integration, wherein different legal orders are 
viewed interdependently and equally.512  The introduction of mediation into OHADA 
and the adoption of expansive corporate social responsibility norms that consider the 
wider community would provide a space for African norms and values to play out.  
Because of their solidarity and coordinative features, cooperatives, as modern 
commercial enterprises, would be especially useful in creating or supporting the 
foundational social and political institutions needed for pluralistic legal development.  
The UA-CS could be an important step on the path to reintegration. 
One of the presumed virtues of OHADA is that it may be able to bypass the 
political obstacles in the region by ‘flying under the radar’ of national 
governments.513  Given the corruption, rent-seeking, and extractive nature of many 
of the states in the region this impulse is understandable, but, even if this were 
possible, it is ultimately self-defeating to attempt it.  Sustainable legal and economic 
development require the active participation of those for whom the law is made and 
for whom development is sought.  Further weakening national structures through 
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supranational rules and institutions will not help remedy the ‘democratic deficit’ that 
already exists in those countries.514  There is also a curious, circular reasoning in the 
idea that OHADA can bypass national, political corruption, while at the same time 
asserting that the ineffectiveness of OHADA is mostly a problem of political will on 
the part of those same nations.515  In any event, the formal law should offer means to 
assist in this process of conciliation of competing demands, not attempt to bypass it, 
as OHADA has done.  
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OHADA laws and institutions have not contributed to economic development and 
have not promoted the inclusive institutions necessary for development to occur.  This is 
so primarily because the OHADA laws and institutions are mostly irrelevant to the 
economic and social life of the vast majority of the people living throughout the OHADA 
region.  The enactment of the Uniform Act on Cooperative Societies now makes 
OHADA law relevant to the informal sector, at least formally, but it is too soon to know 
if the Act will substantively improve the overall situation.  Moreover, the demand for 
OHADA came from domestic and foreign legal elites and not the vast majority of people 
– the constituents – who are subject to the laws.  OHADA is fixated on codification and 
formalisation of laws, when what is needed is functionality and adaptability.  Another 
fundamental problem with OHADA is that in seeking to unify all business laws in the 
region –  by ignoring or attempting to supplant all existing practices and customary laws 
–  the reform effort itself actually impedes development.  Inclusive development requires 
the vitality and involvement of important pluralistic elements in society.  OHADA 
reformers sought to eliminate legal diversity in commercial matters.  What is really 
needed is a reconciliation of the various laws and practices related to economic activity 
within individual countries and throughout the region. 
Some scholars are sceptical of the ability of OHADA to bring about development 
in West Africa, and have reservations about the amount of money spent for the benefit of 
a relatively small clientele.516  While sharing those reservations, this paper has attempted 
to show some possible ways to improve the applicability and receptivity of OHADA laws 
more broadly and inclusively – that is, to link OHADA and the informal sector.  The 
most promising way to make this link would be for the relevant constituents and their 
governments to fully embrace and support the UA-CS.  As of this writing, there is 
insufficient data available about the state of the cooperative sector in the several years 
                                                 





both before and after implementation of UA-CS and so more research is needed.  
Nevertheless, the benefits of cooperatives in enhancing development in the region and in 
linking OHADA with the informal sector could be significant. 
Formal law must create a structure or framework – by facilitating coordinative 
behaviour – within which traditional or local business norms can play out and evolve.  
Formal laws and institutions must also respect, accommodate, and in some cases, defer to 
customary laws.  Modern cooperatives can provide a framework for facilitating 
coordinative behaviour.  Cooperatives and the traditional institutions of mutuality, 
reciprocity, and solidarity that exist throughout West Africa share many of the same 
values, principles, and objectives.  However, the modern cooperatives form can offer 
improved sustainability and growth potential for its members.  Cooperatives can make an 
important contribution to transformational and sustainable development, since collective 
action and mutual aid enhances the capacity and self-help agency of informal sector 
actors.  They allow micro-enterprises to overcome various market barriers and to achieve 
mutual economic goals that cannot be met in isolation. By linking small-scale 
producers to larger markets, cooperatives can improve regional, intra-African, and even 
international trade.  They can also provide more certainty and stability for informal sector 
actors.  The solidarity and collective action features of cooperatives also give people a 
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